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“It is important here first to distinguish between the need for some ‘lender of last resort’ and the 
organization of banking on the ‘national reserve’ principle. ... It is far less obvious why all the  
banking institutions in a particular area or country should rely on a single national reserve. This is  
certainly not a system which anybody would have deliberately devised on rational grounds and it  
grew up as an accidental by-product of a policy concerned with different problems. The rational  
choice would seem to lie between either a system of ‘free banking’, which not only gives all banks  
the right of note issue and at the same time makes it necessary for them to rely on their own 
reserves, but also leaves them free to choose their field of operation and their correspondents 
without regard to national boundaries, and on the other hand, an international central bank. I need 
not add that both of these ideals seem utterly impracticable in the world as we know it. But I am not  
certain whether the compromise we have chosen, that of national central banks which have no 
direct power over the bulk of the national circulation but which hold as the sole ultimate reserve a 
comparatively small amount of gold, is not one of the most unstable arrangements imaginable.” (F.  
A. Hayek, Monetary Nationalism and International Stability, (Graduate Institute of International 
Studies, Geneva, 1937; Good Money, Part II, The Standard, The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek,  
volume 6, Liberty Fund, 2008, p. 88.))
________________
My paper is based on the above paragraph.
I express my gratitudes to Prof. Fabio Masini (University of Rome Tre, Italy), Prof. David Laidler 
(Western University, Canada), Prof. Marcello Messori (University of Rome Tor Vergata, Italy) 
Prof. Hansjörg Klausinger (Vienna University of Economics and Business, Austria)), Prof. Nicola 
Giocoli (University of Pisa, Italy), Prof. Franco Spinelli (University of Brescia) and two other 
anonymous for their useful suggetion and valuable guidance.
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INTRODUCTION:
Money is the one thing competition would not make cheap, because its attractiveness rests on it  
preserving its ‘dearness’. – F.A. Hayek (1976, pp.94)
        This paper addresses the perspective of Hayek’s doctrine on monetary arrangements in the 
economy and his favorable argument for an international central bank over national central bank. I 
also discussed Hayek’s view on free banking (i.e. for the free issue of bank notes) that would enable 
the banks to provide more and cheaper credit. Furthermore, Hayek comes up with an intellectual 
debate on “rational choice” of monetary arrangements whether the commercial banks should have 
the right to issue bank notes (demand for free banking) which can be redeemable in the established 
national gold or silver currency or an international central bank.
        
            In the beginning of the 20th century, even before the WWI, Hayek was well aware of the 
growing concern of separate banking system that had destroyed the homogeneity of the circulating 
of medium of different countries.  He was also concerned with the degree of liquidity or 
acceptability of ‘comparatively small reserves’ of gold in the national central bank (Hayek, 1937 
pp76). 
                Hayek’s philosophical thought in his book “Monetary Nationalism and International 
Stability” (and later his work in “Denationalization of Money”) has raised debates over the years 
among economists, scholars and policy makers about the usefulness of an international central bank 
over national central bank and whether the commercial banks are better able to stabilize the 
currency under free banking rather than a central bank, considered as an agent of government, that 
could develop inflationist tendencies being monopoly in issuing paper currency. Underlying the 
debate, White (1996) in his book “Monetary Nationalism Reconsidered” states about two possible 
international monetary regimes; first a monetary system variously regulated by national 
governments, i.e., what White called it “inside money” and Hayek termed it as “monetary 
nationalism”. Alternatively, deposits and circulations may be provided by private banks operating 
internationally could be termed as “international inside moneys”. The second option is about 
universally free acceptable currency, i.e., commodity money such as gold. Alternatively, an 
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international currency can be created by international central bank, this is “rational choice” what 
Hayek describes – international free banking or international central bank. 
            
                Though Hayek himself did not underpin a “separate regulation of the quantity of money 
in a national area which remains a part of wider economic system” but he largely unsupported 
against maintaining of an independent national currency, which he believed an insulation of a 
country against the financial shocks and that could cause international instability (Hayek, 1937 
pp73).
               Overall, Hayek’s concerned was a stable monetary system. As one of the greatest thinkers 
of his time, Hayek’s doctrine placed a little role for government in controlling money, which he 
believed larger control of government over the money as the cause of instability (Hayek, 1943 
[1960], pp.324-25). Furthermore, he pointed out the least importance of national central bank as an 
agent of government and argued that “...source of disturbance is likely to be much more serious 
when there is only a single bank for a whole region...” (Hayek, 1937, pp.80). 
                
                   This paper focuses on Hayek’s overall philosophy on international money mechanism 
and his intellectual debate of rational choice between the two arrangements – free banking or an 
international central bank and his concerned over unstable arrangements in money mechanism, 
which, he believes, profoundly affects economic and social conditions of people and government. 
Therefore, to reach the conclusion, I outlined Hayek’s perspectives on central bank and 
government, then international gold standard, and finally, his choice between free banking and an 
international central banking which is central theme of this paper.  
HAYEK ON NATIONAL CENTRAL BANK
“But I am not certain whether the compromise we have chosen, that of national central banks  
which have no direct power over the bulk of the national circulation but which hold as the sole  
ultimate reserve a comparatively small amount of gold, is not one of the most unstable 
arrangements imaginable(pp76-77).”
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           The above epigraph states Hayek’s doubt over central bank as a stable arrangement. Though 
the argument is not quite accomplished, but Hayek’s trustworthiness doctrine does not agree with 
the centralization of reserves within a single bank for a whole economy. Furthermore, Hayek (1937 
[1964] pp.76) argued that “With all the good will and intelligence in the world, and with all the 
independence from the political authority, a central bank could not really carry out a sensible policy 
as long as it was constrained by that institutional arrangement”. Particularly, even an independent 
central bank is surrounded with other institutional constraints and that its monopoly power over 
currency circulation, could make various instabilities at national level and could raise certain 
concerns to the international financial system as well; such as foreign exchange and international 
circulation medium. 
                Under central banking system, the main constraint is fractional reserve banking. Hayek 
points out the unproductive adjustment of domestic money supply with fractional reserve on 
investment and insists that it has real impacts on incomes, profits and the rate of investment. Here, 
for example, his view -  "It is as if all balances of international payments had to squeeze through a 
narrow bottle neck as special pressure has to be brought on people, who would otherwise not have 
been affected by the change, to give up money which they would have invested productively" 
(Hayek 1937 [1964], pp. 30). But, under fractional reserve banking with the central bank adjusting 
its liabilities in response to changes in its foreign reserves, the expenditure reductions will not be 
undertaken necessarily by those "... who would ultimately have to do so under a homogeneous 
international currency system, and ... the equilibrium so reached will be of its nature only 
temporary." (Hayek 1937 [1964] 28) as cited by Flanders (1994).
                 But, the central bank being an agent of government, with its monopoly power over the 
issue of currency, could develop inflationist tendencies (Laidler, 2005) of its own that can be coined 
as “new inflation” and being the bankers’ bank, it would have both incentives and opportunities to 
debase their liabilities at the expenses of an ill-informed public (Laidler, 2005, p.3) that would 
destabilize the monetary system. Nevertheless, the central bank is not a natural product of the 
development of the banking system (Smith, 1990). On the contrary, it is coercively imposed from 
outside the market as a result of government action (Huerta de Soto, 1995). 
                 Hayek insisted that the central bank being a single financial entity couldn’t control the 
financial stability and pointed out "it is practically impossible for any single bank, acting alone, to 
apply the only control by which the demand for credit can, in the long run, be successfully kept 
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within bounds; that is, an increase in its interest charges (Hayek, 1931, 2008)”. He further showed 
his concerned over the liquidity preference " ... that this source of disturbance is likely to be much 
more serious when there is only a single bank for a whole region or when all the banks of a country 
have to rely on a single central bank; since the effect of any change in liquidity preference will 
generally be confined to the group of people who directly or indirectly rely on the same reserve of 
more liquid assets." (Hayek 1937 [1964] 80)
             Mises (1912) 1980, 347; [1928] 1978, 139-40) argued that historically observed 
overexpansion by banking systems were attributable to policies that had abridged competitive 
discipline, particularly, the creation of privileged banks to which national governments had granted 
monopolies of note issue and permission to suspend payments, making system wide expansion 
possible and reducing banker conservatism (creating moral hazard) (cited from White). Hayek 
(1937, pp. 90-91) agreed with Mises that central banks could and in practice did worsen the cycle 
problem by fostering rather than restraining unwarranted credit expansion. Furtherance, Hayek 
in Denationalization of Money wrote about “the obvious corollary that the abolition of the 
government issue of money should involve also the disappearance of central banks as we know 
them” [Hayek, 1976, page 105]. 
           
             In concern to central banking as central planning, Glasner (2005) claimed that central 
banking is not central planning. Central banks are government monopolies that consciously try to 
steer the economy. If that is not central planning, nothing is. Much earlier in his work, Hayek 
argued insightfully to the effect that central banking is a form of central planning: ‘A single 
monopolistic government agency can neither possess the information which should govern the 
supply of money nor would it, if it knew what it ought to do in the general interest, usually be in a 
position to act in that manner (Hayek, 1976, pp.102).” So, the Austrians favor abolition of central 
banks and of restrictions but advocate the retention of outside money, convertible into something 
(Flanders, 1994, pp.6-7). 
             From the above discussion, we know that Hayek was not in favor of a national central bank 
and he proposed a variety of reforms during his works. Hayek (1937, pp88-89) advised, a useful 
central bank "will have to act persistently against the trend of the movement of credit in the country, 
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to contract the credit basis when the superstructure tends to expand and to expand the former when 
the latter tends to contract,"
                Even in today’s world, Hayek’s work is well appreciated and I wouldn’t be much surprise 
if economics students study and try to understand his work in 2050. Recently, Thomas M. Hoenig, 
ex-chief of The Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, said “The central bank has to be, in a way, a 
neutral player, and yet we find ourselves trying to stimulate, and the effect is further leveraging,” he 
said. “If I thought zero rates would bring jobs, I’d want it forever. But it distorts the economy.” 
Many economists are considering it as a defense to the Hayek’s thinking on central banking 
(Gretchen, 2011). But not all economists would, of course, agree, such that, economist Prof. Masini 
(for discussion see Masini 2012) argues that “can you imagine what would happen right now if 
interests rates should raise according to the Hoenig view? Higher interests rates on private 
mortgages would further decrease aggregate demand, higher cost of money would further 
discourage investments and higher service on public debt would bring to sovereign defaults...”.  So, 
this issue still requires more research to find a scientific conclusion. 
HAYEK ON GOVERNMENT
“The history of government management of money has, except for a few happy periods, been one of
incessant fraud and deception”. - Hayek (1988, pp.103)
               
                I am well convinced, after an extensive literature review, that Hayek was not a supporter 
of government intervention and argued that government interference would deprive the “good 
money”. In his debate, he argued as an influential exponent and questioned that the monopoly of 
government of issuing money has not only deprived us of good money but has also deprived us of 
the only process by which we can find out what would be good money. Furthermore, as concerned 
to the quality of money, he added, “We do not even quite know what exact qualities we want 
because in the two thousand years in which we have used coins and other money, we have never 
been allowed to experiment with it, we have never been given a chance to find out what the best 
kind of money would be” (Hayek, 1977, 2008). Hayek’s past experience and research put 
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government in narrow place, and pointed out that the monopoly authoritative does not produce 
welfare to the people and the society as well. 
              Furtherance, Hayek on the role of government in the monetary system, expressed his 
opinion that private enterprise can issue “good money” and not government. In his word, Hayek 
(1999) articulated that “As a result I am more convinced than ever that if we ever again are going to 
have a decent money, it will not come from government: it will be issued by private enterprise, 
because providing the public with good money which it can trust and use can not only be an 
extremely profitable business; it imposes on the issuer a discipline to which the government has 
never been and cannot be subject. It is a business which competing enterprise can maintain only if it 
gives the public as good money as anybody else”.
                
                Hayek (1960) as a responsible citizen further debated that people are now well aware of 
the importance of a stable monetary system and showed his concern about the “great monetary 
disturbance”.  He assumed Government “a much more active part in controlling money” and 
remarked “as much a cause as a consequence of instability”.  Hayek further into his debate 
convinced for “spontaneous market process”, and insisted that people will be better off “if 
governments were deprived of their control over monetary policy”. In his word – “Why, it is 
sometimes asked, should we not rely on the spontaneous forces of the market to supply whatever is 
needed for a satisfactory medium of exchange as we do in most other respects?” (Hayek, 1960). 
Going back to the history, Hayek (1988, pp.103) mentioned “the history of government 
management of money has, except for a few happy periods, been one of incessant fraud and 
deception”.
 
                So, Hayek does not seem to have appreciated governments, but is more convinced that 
government too, can engage in intertemporal misallocation which will have a direct impact on the 
people and the state as well. In a lecture delivered at a conference, Hayek (1977, pp.1) concluded “I 
am afraid I am convinced that the hope of ever again placing on government this discipline is 
gone”. 
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HAYEK ON INTERNATIONAL GOLD STANDARD
“I may be mistaken in my belief that this mystique of gold has disappeared for good, but, until I see
more evidence to the contrary, I do not believe that an attempt to restore the gold standard can be
more than temporarily successful”. - Hayek (1960, pp.462)
                I am now more convinced that, Hayek, at the earlier stage of his work, favors gold 
standard and recommends an international gold standard with powers for the Bank for International 
Settlements to control national use of claims on gold rather than gold itself. Hayek (1935) points 
out, the gold standard is subject to two defects – the first applying to all international standards, 
namely, the lack of willingness of individual countries to adjust their national economies to an 
international standard; the second inherent in gold, namely, the periodic maladjustments between 
demand for and supply of gold. 
         
               Hayek agreed that “there is, however, no practical alternative to the gold standard. No 
other standard has the slightest chance of general agreement or even support from all the great 
countries. …If an international standard is wanted, the gold standard, in spite of its undeniable 
defects, is the only practical choice”. So, Hayek was fully confident that only gold is the “practical 
alternative”.
               Recently, Glasner (2011) discussed that, Hayek, in defense of the Insane Bank of France, 
made a fundamental error assuming that a small open economy (which France could be considered 
to have been in the late 1920s) had control over its money supply and its price level under the gold 
standard. It is believed that Hayek was on the wrong side of coin defending France’s policy on gold 
standard. When there was an unwelcome climate and suspension of gold convertibility (or 
devaluing the currency in gold terms) in the wake of the great depression 1930, Hayek, on the other 
hand, along with von Mises, not only advocated for gold standard but also, he accepted, if not 
welcomed, deflation as the necessary price for maintaining the gold standard. Faced with a conflict 
between maintaining the gold standard and following his own criterion for neutral money, Hayek 
along with his colleague Robbins both opted for maintaining the gold standard (Glasner, 2011). 
Hayek (1931) further articulated following the abandonment of gold standard, particularly in 
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Britain, “... However, it can scarcely be doubted that the renewed monetary problems of almost the 
whole world have nothing to do with the tendencies inherent in the gold standard” (p.153)
                 Furthermore, Hayek believed that an improvement in gold mining technology which 
could halve the cost of production of gold and double the price, does not produce any price 
distortions but if a fiat-money government were to undertake policies that double the price level in 
the absence of improvements in gold mining technology, that would produce price system 
distortions that lead to overinvestment and require a prolonged and painful liquidation to put things 
right (Glasner 2011).
              On gold reserve at the central bank, Hayek further argued “It is the regulation of the extent 
to which gold exchange (immediately realizable claims on the other gold standard currencies) shall 
be used as a substitute for gold in the reserve of central banks”.  Hayek’s attachment to the gold 
standard is often criticized by economists coining as “wrong choice” but Hayek, later in his work, 
disavowed his support for the gold standard as early as 1943 in a paper (“A Commodity Reserve 
Currency”) and he reaffirmed his opposition to the gold standard in The Constitution of Liberty (p. 
335). He expressed his view that “no single country could effectively restore it (gold standard) by 
independent action” and he further pointed out that though it is doubtful whether the abandonment 
was a gain but its restoration at present is not a practical proposition. 
    
              In his foregoing argument, Hayek (1943) adjudged that “I may be mistaken in my belief 
that this mystique of gold has disappeared for good, but, until I see more evidence to the contrary, I 
do not believe that an attempt to restore the gold standard can be more than temporarily successful”. 
Hayek, even, believed that the restoration of international gold standard deserved more attention 
than it had received earlier, and he asserted that “they hardly offer a practical alternative for the near 
future” (Pp.335). In the end Hayek admitted that the gold standard would be unworkable.
G A N E S W A R  S A H O O                                                                                                                                                                                              9 | P a g e
ALTERNATIVE BANKING REGIME: FREE BANKING OR AN INTERNATIONAL 
CENTRAL BANK
The rational choice would seem to lie between either a system of ‘free banking’, which not only 
gives all banks the right of note issue and at the same time makes it necessary for them to rely on 
their own reserves, but also leaves them free to choose their field of operation and their 
correspondents without regard to national boundaries, and on the other hand, an international  
central bank. (Hayek 1937 [164] 77)
             
             This epigraph is the central debate of our essay. Walter Bagehot, the Victorian editor of the 
Economist, reminds us that “money will not manage itself”, that means money must be managed 
through institutional arrangements. Hayek is generally known as a strong supporter of the free 
market economy but his intellectual debate is about “the choice between free banking without 
regard to national borders and international central bank-depends crucially on spelling out the 
criteria of good monetary policy and comparing the alternative systems’ abilities to fulfill them” 
(White 1998). So, Hayek, about 75 years ago, wrote that the rational choice seems to lie between 
two alternatives – a full-fledged free banking (without any consideration of specific monetary 
policy as conventionally understood), and on the other hand, a world central bank conducting an 
international monetary policy. It is well noted here that Hayek even did not consider a central bank 
an option as a monetary arrangement. I studied that, Hayek (1932; 1937; 1939) deals more directly 
with the international economic and monetary relations.  Masini (2004) observes that Hayek’s 
reference to the international institutional framework in his works in 1937 and 1939 is clearly aimed 
at strongly reducing the intervention of (national) public authorities into the realm of economic 
relationships. Hayek’s intention for international central bank is quite clear, what Hayek (1937; 
1939) states a “the transfer of monetary sovereignty from nation-States to a supranational authority” 
that is “clearly and merely a means to minimize public interventions into the operation of the global 
market, not a matter of conflicts resolution” (Masini 2004).  So, Hayek (1937; 1939) argues in favor 
of an international system of economic and political institutions designed along the federal 
constitutional principles.
    
                Furthermore, Hayek, in his book The Road to Serfdom of 1944, in fact, insists on the 
constitutional relevance of supra-national federalism, although confined to minimal competences: 
“The need is for an international authority which, without power to direct the different people what 
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they must do, must be able restrain them from action which will damage others” and argues for a 
regulated “international authority should be strictly circumscribed by the Rule of Law” (Hayek 
1944; 172-3). 
                    However, in reference to free banking, at a later time, the two most prominent 
supporters of laissez-faire, Milton Friedman and F. A. Hayek, both rejected free banking in no 
uncertain terms (Friedman 1960, pp 4-9; Hayek, 1960, p324): the idea of free banking seemed too 
radical even for them. Both writers have since retracted their earlier arguments against free banking, 
and Hayek went on to champion the idea in 1970s and afterwards.  (For discussion, please see 
Hankbook of International Banking, edited by A. W. Mullineux,Victor Murinde, pp185)
                  Nevertheless, Hayek (1974; 2008) subsequently argued for decent money in free market 
monetary system and convinced that “it will not come from government: it will be issued by private 
enterprise”, and his further argued "... whether institutions other than government should be allowed 
to issue dollar notes. That, of course, would not work. But if private institutions began to issue notes 
under some other names without any fixed rate of exchange with the official money or each other, 
so far as I know this is in no major country actually prohibited by law."(Hayek, 1977, pp.5) (I have 
already discussed about Hayek on government). However, Hayek (1999), as concerned to free 
banking, noted disadvantages that “nobody would be in a position, by a deliberate policy, to offset 
the tendency to cumulative changes” that would remain but suggested that “this might not be so 
serious if there were numerous small banks whose spheres of operation freely overlapped over the 
whole world” (cited from White, 1999a, pp.763).  However, at the end of his career, Hayek 
switched to favoring laissez faire in money-issue as a means to achieve price-level stabilization and 
his book the ‘denationalization of money’ offers resources and advocates modern free banking 
regime (White 1999a, pp.767). 
 
                     After an extensive literature review, I completely agree with White’s conclusion 
(1996) that Hayek did not endorse the establishment of a multinational fiat money and his 
philosophy does not support a national central bank as a monetary arrangement and also seems 
unsupported for the use of gold as the international money, but he presumes the use of gold merely 
as “exist compelling political reasons” (Hayek 1937, 75). Selgin (1988, 1991) as an advocate of free 
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banking, cited, that “a free banking system is better equipped than a central banking system to 
maintain it” (see White, 1996).   
CONCLUSIONARY COMMENT
The rational choice between the two alternatives - free banking and an international central bank
“depends crucially on spelling out the criteria of good monetary policy and comparing the
alternative systems’ ability to fulfill them”…. and “anyone who shares Hayek’s “practical” 
concern with counteracting central banks’ tendency toward unwarranted expansions of the quantity  
of money may well find a free banking system to be the best practical alternative, given the 
temptations to which central banks are prone. A world central bank, and to a slightly lesser extent  
a pan-European central bank, would be a monopolist without any competitive discipline”.
                                                                                                      – Lawrence H. White (1996)
               
                Hayek, the gold standard champion in late 1930s, in the post Bretton Woods years, argued 
for an international economy based on money denationalization (a truly international monetary 
system), or, more precisely, a homogenous world currency which would be used extensively and its 
movement determined wholly by the actions of free trading individuals in different nations, i.e., free 
international currency competition and free banking (Endres 2005, pp.168). Hayek (1937) made a 
strong case in principle for the generation of international financial stability by reintroducing a full 
gold standard. 
                It is believed that Hayek’s renewed interest on “free banking” could have been inspired 
by the publication of Murray Rothbard’s “What Has Government Done to Our Money?” in 1963 
(Lakomma 2007). So, Hayek, over time and situation, has changed his view over one another. In 
1976, Hayek, in his book The Denationalization of Money, advocated that rather than re-instituting 
a government-mandated gold standard, a free market in money be allowed to develop, with issuers 
of money competing with each other to produce the best, most stable and healthy currency. Further, 
he suggested that financial institutions should print money that offers a more stable value than 
either gold and silver or national moneys. Competition, he suggests, will keep money's values stable 
since money losing value hurts creditors, and money gaining value hurts debitors. Hence the market 
would choose the 'best moneys' who best struck a balance between depreciation and appreciation. 
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                Finally, Friedrich von Hayek who advocated for “a truly international monetary system” 
in 1937 that “the rational choice would seem to lie between either a system of ‘free banking’ . . . 
and on the other hand, an international central bank”, Lawrence White, in commenting on Hayek’s 
work, has maintained that this choice “depends crucially on spelling out the criteria of good 
monetary policy and comparing the alternative systems’ ability to fulfill them”. Interestingly, as 
questioned by Koch, leaving aside, for the time being, the possibilities for a system of “free 
banking”, how might one structure the choice between an international central bank that was 
committed to global price stability and Benn Steil’s proposal for a system which involves a smaller 
number of stable currencies, governed by national or regional central banks that would also be 
committed to a non-inflationary policy regime? (for discussion please see, Koch 2007, pp.13). It is 
undoubtedly argued, that the “rational choice” of what Hayek described 75 years ago, today still 
requires more works to come up with an applicable solution.
                     On the whole, I would like to conclude collectively, that Hayek in 1937 possibly 
preferred an international monetary authority over a system of international free banking, though he 
did not express a clear preference. I completely agree with White’s (1996) concluding comments in 
his analysis paper “Monetary Nationalism Reconsidered”,  that “anyone who shares Hayek’s 
“practical” concern with counteracting central banks’ tendency toward unwarranted expansions of 
the quantity of money may well find a free banking system to be the best practical alternative, given 
the temptations to which central banks are prone. A world central bank, and to a slightly lesser 
extent a pan-European central bank, would be a monopolist without any competitive discipline”. 
G A N E S W A R  S A H O O                                                                                                                                                                                              13 | P a g e
REFERENCE:
 
1. Endres, A. M, (2005), Great Architects of International Finance: The Bretton Woods Era, pp.168
2. Flanders, M June (1994), Hayek and the revival of free banking
3. Glasner, David (2005, 2011), Free Banking and Monetary Reform
4. Huerta de Soto, Jesus (1995), A Critical Analysis of Central Banks and Fractional-Reserve Free Banking from 
the Austrian School Perspective 
5.  Hayek, F. A. (1931), The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek: Good Money, Part 1, pp.153
6.  F. A. Hayek F.A. (1932), The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek, Good Money, Part 1, p. 160 Hayek’s 1932 
Defense of the Insane Bank of France
7. Hayek, F. A. (1935), A regulated Gold Standard, the Economist, May 11, 1935
8. Hayek, F.A. (1937[1964]), Monetary Nationalism and International Stability
9. Hayek, F. A. (1939), The Economic Conditions of Inter-state Federalism, New Commonwealth Quarterly. V 
(2, Sept.): 131-149; reprinted in Idem (1948). Individualism and Economic Order. Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press, 255-272.
10. Hayek, F. A. (1943[1960]), The Constitution of Liberty (pp. 324-25)
11. Hayek, F. A. (1944), The Road to Serfdom
12. Hayek F. A. (1974; 2008), A Free Market Monetary System
13. Hayek, F. A. (1976), Denationalization of Money
14. Hayek, F. A. (1977), Towards a Free Market Monetary System (pp.1)
15. Hayek, F. A. (1988), The Fatal Conceit: the Errors of Socialism, (pp.103)
16. Hayek F.A., (1999), Good Money, Vol.6, Part III, pp.230 edited by Stephen Kresge.
17. Hayek, F. A (2008)., Prices and Production and other works, pp93  
18. Hoppe, Hans-Hermann (1194), F. A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique
19. Lakomma, Erik (2007), Free Banking in Sweden 1830-1903: Experience and Debate
20. Masini, Fabio (2004), Designing the Institutions of International Liberalism: the Interwar Period
21.  Masini, Fabio (2012), Designing the institutions of international liberalism: some contributions from the 
interwar period,  journals Constitutional Political Economy
22. Morgenson, Gretchen (2011), Conventional Fed Wisdom, Defied, New York Times, published on 14/08/2011
23. Laider, David (2005), Free Banking and the Bank of Canada
24. Selgin, George (2011), Give Credit Where Credit is due
25. Smith, Vera C. (1990), The Rationale of Central Banking and the Free Banking Alternative Indianapolis, .Ind. 
Liberty Press,    1990, chap. 12, p. 169. ).
26. Walter Block and Kenneth M. Garschina, Hayek, Business Cycles and Fractional Reserve Banking: 
Continuing the De-Homogenization Process
G A N E S W A R  S A H O O                                                                                                                                                                                              14 | P a g e
27. White, Lawrence H. (1992), Competition and Currency (pp.128-129)
28. White, Lawrence H. (1996), Monetary Nationalism Reconsidered
29. White, Lawrence H. (1999a), Why Didn't Hayek Favor Laissez Faire in Banking?, published in History of 
Political Economy, Duke University Press.
30. White, Lawrence H. (1999b), Hayek's Monetary Theory and Policy: A Critical Reconstruction
31. White, Lawrence H. (2006), The Free Banking Alternative
 
32. White, Lawrence H. (2011), A Gold Standard with Free Banking Would Have Restrained the Boom and Bust.
33.  ----, Hayek, Free Banking, and the Commodity Money Syndrome: Toward A Praxeological Theory of Credit 
and Money
G A N E S W A R  S A H O O                                                                                                                                                                                              15 | P a g e
